CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DEFENDANT MAY NOT BE REQUIRED
TO BEAR

THE BURDEN

OF PROOF AS TO PREJUDICE WHERE

COUNSEL COMMITS A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF AN ARTICU-

DUTY-United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).
LATED

On the evening of May 27, 1970, Roger Crump was accosted by
three men who stole his wallet, allegedly at knifepoint.' Plainclothes
officers Box and Ehler witnessed the incident, pursued the assailants
and apprehended Willie DeCoster, Jr. in the D.C. Annex Hotel. 2
DeCoster, along with suspects Douglas Eley and Earl Taylor, was
arrested and subsequently arraigned "on charges of armed robbery,
robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon." 3 At the arraignment pro4
ceeding, counsel was appointed to represent DeCoster.
Prior to trial, there were several disagreements between DeCoster and his appointed counsel as to certain of the latter's legal
judgments.' A jury of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found DeCoster guilty of armed robbery as well as
1 United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Although Mr.
Crump testified that he was robbed at knifepoint, the only weapon found on any of the
assailants was a straight razor. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 2, 3
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).
2 United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).
The victim identified his three assailants immediately following their apprehension but
was unable to make an identification at trial because of a subsequent vision impairment,
suffered in an unrelated automobile accident. Id.
3 Brief for Appellant at 1, United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir.
1973), [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. DeCoster testified that earlier in the
afternoon he had been with Roger Crump at a local bar. He further stated that after
leaving the bar he proceeded to his hotel, at which time he was arrested. United States
v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976). This was contradicted
by the testimony of Officer Box, who indicated that he witnessed Eley holding the victim while DeCoster went through the victim's pockets. Taylor served as a lookout. Brief
for Appellant, supra at 7.
4 United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).
5 The defendant's initial grievance with counsel's performance was his failure to file
promptly a motion for bond review. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at
3-4 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976). The original motion was filed on November 9, 1970,
approximately thirty days after the defendant was accepted by The Black Man's Development Center for pre-trial custody. Id. Furthermore, the motion failed to mention
the Center's willingness to accept third-party custody. Id. See generally Supplemental
Brief for Appellant at 16, United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
[hereinafter referred to as Supplemental Brief for Appellant].
Other matters of controversy included counsel's failure to investigate the disposition of the charges against Eley and Taylor, his failure to seek and interview witnesses
and his failure to object to the prison garb worn by the appellant at trial. Id. at 18-23.
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the lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. 6 On
appeal, in United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster J),7 the District of
Columbia Circuit raised the issue, sua sponte, of whether DeCoster
was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at the trial level. 8 Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority,
remanded the case for a hearing on appointed counsel's effectiveness
based upon a defendant's right "to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate." 9
Although the strategic and tactical decisions of counsel were not at
issue, 10 the trial record presented substantial questions concerning
"counsel's preparation and investigation." 1
6 United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 1-2 & n.1, 3 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
19, 1976). DeCoster received a sentence of two to eight years for the armed robbery
conviction. Id. at I & n.1. Conviction for the lesser included offense was vacated because it arose out of the same act. Id.
7 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
s United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976).
The court's power to raise an issue on its own accord is derived from FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(b) (Plain Error). This rule provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." The
primary function of the provision is to eliminate "errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856, at 374 (1969). Inherent in this consideration is a clear
concern for the rights of the defendant. Id.
9 487 F.2d at 1201-02 (emphasis deleted). Prior to DeCoster I, the test in the District of Columbia Circuit for determining when a defendant had been denied his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was whether "there ha[d] been gross
incompetence of counsel and that this ha[d] in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense." Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see
note 54 infra and accompanying text.
10 487 F.2d at 1201. Traditionally, the court has never questioned the tactical decisions of counsel, nor his errors in judgment. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense
Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L.
REv. 289, 300-01 (1964). Adherence to this view "requires only that every tactical decision and every deviation from the rules be based on a reasoned and informed judgment." Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 826 (1976).
This is the position taken by the DeCoster I court. 487 F.2d at 1201.
1 487 F.2d at 1201. Although counsel had "announced he was ready" to go to trial,
United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster II), No. 72-1283, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19,
1976), it was found that he was not prepared to offer the names and addresses of prospective alibi witnesses. 487 F.2d at 1201. The Government had previously served a
written notice of alibi demand which, pursuant to the local rule requires the defense to
inform the prosecution, within twenty days of the demand, of its intention to set forth
an alibi defense as well as the names and addresses of those witnesses to be relied
upon. 487 F.2d at 1200-01. By comparison, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide ten days within which to respond. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a). During a discussion
with the trial judge, counsel stated that because the twenty days had not elapsed, he
desired a continuance. However, when reminded that he had announced that he was
ready, counsel indicated that he would not rely on an alibi defense. 487 F.2d at 1200.
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On remand, the trial court found no denial of adequate assis13
tance of counsel1 2 and denied appellant's motion for a new trial.
The conviction was reversed, however, by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. DeCoster
(DeCoster II)."l Chief Judge Bazelon, again writing for the majority,
held that in view of the probable deleterious effect of counsel's total
failure to conduct an investigation, the omission constituted a violation of DeCoster's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. 5 In light of the central role such a constitutional right plays
in the adjudicative process, the burden of establishing the harmlessness of ineffective counsel was placed upon the Government. 1 6 Since
Furthermore, counsel was not aware of the disposition of the cases against Eley and
Taylor until the trial judge informed him that evidence was introduced at their trial.
DeCoster II, slip op. at 5; Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 18. The
case against DeCoster was severed from that of the other defendants because he had
absconded upon being conditionally released and was not returned to custody until
after Eley's and Taylor's trial had begun. See DeCoster II, slip op. at 4.
12 See United States v. DeCoster, No. 2002-71 (D.D.C. Apr, 23, 1975), rev'd, United
States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976). The district court had concluded that "counsel did raise the only defense available to him, which defense was
putting the government to its proof." United States v. DeCoster, No. 2002-71, slip op. at
19. Judge Waddy stated that
while it might appear that defense counsel was less than a "diligent conscientious advocate," the weight of the government's case at trial and supported on
the hearing on remand convinces this Court that DeCoster was not prejudiced
thereby and not denied the "reasonably competent assistance of an attorney"
under the circumstances.
Id. at 20.
Thus, the trial court analyzed the facts of this case, applied the law as established
in DeCoster I, and concluded that the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel was not abridged. Id. at 19-20.
13 United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976); see United
States v. DeCoster, No. 2002-71 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 23, 1975) (order denying motion for
new trial).
14 No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976) (appeal heard by Bazelon, C.J., Wright, J.,
and MacKinnon, J.).
15 Id.

16 Id.

at 22-23.

at 24-25. The inherent difficulty in the harmless error concept lies in assessing the impact that a constitutional or evidentiary error may have had on the outcome of
a trial. The primary problem is determining what standard to use as a measure of harmlessness. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error,59 VA. L. REV. 988, 988-90 (1973).
In the development and application of standards to be used in judging the harmlessness of error, the American system of criminal justice has historically distinguished
between constitutional and non-constitutional errors. For example, it has been held by
the Supreme Court that a constitutional error could never be harmless. Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). However, Professor Saltzburg suggests that a rational
harmless error test should focus on the type of case (i.e., civil or criminal) in which the
error arises. Saltzburg, supra at 989. He bases this proposition on the difference in
the quantum of proof required by the plaintiff to secure a judgment in a criminal case as
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the Government failed to discharge this burden, the conviction was
17
reversed.
The ultimate issue before the DeCoster II court-whether a defendant who alleges a denial of his sixth amendment guarantee to
effective assistance of counsel bears the burden of establishing prejudice from such a denial-is one which strikes at the very heart of the
adversarial process. Fundamental to our common law jurisprudence
is an underlying assumption that an accused in a criminal proceeding must be afforded assistance of counsel to maintain the necessary
equilibrium in an adversarial proceeding. isAlthough it is difficult to
precisely define this sixth amendment right, its importance has
nevertheless been recognized by the Supreme Court.
Powell v. Alabama 19 was the Supreme Court's first explication of
the right to effective assistance of counsel. In that case, seven defendants who had been convicted of rape and sentenced to death had
not been given an opportunity to retain private counsel nor was
counsel appointed until the day of trial. 20 The Court held that such
late appointment constituted a denial of due process 2' and expressly
recognized for the first time that assistance of counsel is one of the
" 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions.' "22 It was further implied
that effectiveness of counsel's assistance was an inherent element of
this sixth amendment right.23 Thus, relying on the due process clause
opposed to civil. Id. at 991-95; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (a crime
must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt").
Reasoning that appellate review should guarantee "the same high degree of certainty" of the verdict as in the proceeding below, Saltzburg advocates the imposition of
a "reasonable-possibility standard" to measure harmlessness in all criminal cases.
Saltzburg, supra at 1021-28. Moreover, he believes that as a corollary to this standard,
the government must bear "the risk of error." See id. at 994-95. Thus, error would
necessitate reversal unless the Government can show beyond a reasonable doubt that
such an error did not influence the resulting verdict. For a discussion of a uniform
standard as an alternative approach, see R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS
ERROR 55-81 (1970).
17DeCoster II, slip op. at 25.
18 The sixth amendment provides that an "accused shall enjoy the right .. .to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19287 U.S. at 45 (1932).
20 Id. at 49-53, 56.
21 Id. at 71.
22 Id. at 67 (quoting from Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926)).
23See 287 U.S. at 58, 71. Justice Sutherland noted that although counsel was present at trial, no investigation was made nor was any opportunity provided to do so. Id. at
58. This absence of preparation and investigation had been characterized by Chief Justice Anderson, dissenting from the Alabama supreme court decision, as resulting in a
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of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court provided the basis
from which the concept of effectiveness of counsel could be expanded
24
and articulated.
Since Powell, federal courts have labored to establish a workable
definition of "effective assistance" in determining whether there has
been a violation of this sixth amendment right. The traditional test,
emphasizing the guarantees of the fifth amendment due process
clause, 25 required that the defendant prove counsel's ineffectiveness
by showing that the lack of assistance resulted in a "farce or mockery"
of justice. 2 6 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
adopted the "farce and mockery" test in Diggs v. Welch, 2 7 where the
defendant alleged that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by
his appointed counsel. 28 This decision was significant in the historical
development of the right to effective assistance of counsel in two important respects. First, the court explicitly identified the right to
effective assistance as one derived from the due process clausespecifically, the right to a fair trial. 29 Second, the court stated that
"' pro forma' " defense rather than a " 'zealous and active' " one. Id. at 58 (italics in
original). Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel was not
provided "in any substantial sense." Id.
24
See id. at 71; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). Even though the
holding in Powell was limited to capital offenses, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), relying on Powell and Gideon,
prohibited imprisonment "for any offense" unless the defendant was represented by an
attorney. Id. at 32-33, 37. The Court maintained that the rationale of both Powell and
Gideon "has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived of his liberty." Id. at 32.
25 For want of a more definitive standard, courts have relied upon a defendant's
right to a fair trial pursuant to the due process clause of the fifth amendment in evaluating effective assistance. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). In consideration of this inexactitude, one court has expressly admitted that ineffective assistance claims "raise questions of extreme difficulty
in the administration of justice." Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
26 This traditional test was, at one time, adopted by all of the circuit courts. Recent
Development, Criminal Defendants Entitled to Reasonably Competent Assistance of
Counsel, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 193, 197 n.28 (1974). The First, Second and Tenth Circuits continue to adhere to this test. E.g., Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187
(10th Cir. 1977); Rickenbacker v. Warden, Auburn Correction Facility, 550 F.2d 62, 65
(2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1976).
27 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). In affirming the lower
court's dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus, the court of appeals held that to justify
a hearing on the issue of the ineffectiveness of counsel, the circumstances surrounding
the proceeding must have rendered the trial "a farce and a mockery of justice." 148
F.2d at 669.
28 148 F.2d at 668.
29 Id. The court construed the sixth amendment as requiring only the presence of
counsel at trial. It did not consider the right to assistance of counsel to be "impaired by
counsel's mistakes subsequent to a proper appointment." Id. at 668.
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the test was to be construed literally to avoid creating a situation
whereby every conviction would result in a post-conviction hearing
30
on counsel's effectiveness.
This traditional test has been superseded in a majority of the
circuits by a reasonableness standard 3 ' as exemplified by the Third
Circuit in Moore v. United States.3 2 The Moore court confronted a
situation in which a member-attorney of the " 'Voluntary Defender's
Office' " failed to confer with the defendant until one day before the
trial.3 3 The defendant had been represented by another attorney at
the arraignment.3 4 In determining whether the defendant was effectively assisted, the court stated that "the standard of adequacy of
legal services as in other professions is the exercise of the customary
3
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place. 5
Comparison of this standard with the "farce and mockery" test indicates a shift from evaluating the fairness of the trial to appraising the
30 Id. at 669-70. The court felt that such a strict interpretation of the term "ineffectiveness," i.e., only extreme circumstances justifying relief, was necessitated by the
practicalities of review. Id. It was further stated that
[t]here are no tests by which it can be determined how many errors an attorney
may make before his batting average becomes so low as to make his representation ineffective. The only practical standard for habeas corpus is the presence
or absence of judicial character in the proceedings as a whole.
Id. at 670.
31 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
adopted what can generally be categorized as a reasonableness test. E.g., Cooper v.
Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663,
666 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th
Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); West v.
Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730,
736 (3d Cir. 1970); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
849 (1968).
32 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
33Id. at 732.
34Id.
. Id. at 736. This test was alluded to by the Supreme Court four months before
Moore was decided. See NcMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). In
McMann, the Court was confronted with an allegation of counsel inadequacy. Specifically, counsel was accused of misadvising the defendant to plead guilty-advice which
was based upon the mistaken belief that a prior confession was admissible. Id. at
768-70. Justice White maintained that
a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged
the admissibility of the defendant's confession. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends .. .on whether that advice was
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Id. at 770-71 (footnote omitted).
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quality of counsel's services in deciding whether counsel provided effective assistance. 3 6 Concomitantly, the court relied upon the sixth
amendment as the source of the right to effective assistance of counsel rather than the traditional fifth amendment due process clause
test.

37

Although the Moore court did not consider whether a constitutional violation necessarily requires reversal, that issue had been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Chapman v.
California.38 There, the Court held that constitutional error does not
mandate automatic reversal, but rather treats as "harmfil" only those
"errors that 'affect substantial rights.' -39 Chapman further required
that "someone other than the person prejudiced by [the error must
bear the] burden to show that it was harmless." 40 Such a showing
36 See 432 F.2d at 735, 737. "The adequacy of the representation which petitioner
received . . .can only be decided on an evaluation of the services rendered on his
behalf" Id. at 735; cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (Powell requires
an evaluation of counsel's ability to prevent defendant's rights from being abridged).
The Moore court further maintained that such a determination, in light of "the level of
normal competency," was the basis upon which a claim of ineffectiveness can be adjudicated. 432 F.2d at 737. kMoreover, this finding was determinative without deciding
the issue of prejudice. Id.
37 432 F.2d at 737.

-

38 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
39 Id. at 23 (quoting from FED. R. CRfIM. P. 52(a)). Prior to Chapman, the Supreme
Court either ignored the precept that a constitutional error could be harmless or expressly refuted such a finding. Coinprjre Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (did
not consider the possibility of harmless error) with Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
55 (1961) (where a defendant has been denied the assistance of counsel at a critical
stage in the proceeding, "we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted"). In
an earlier case Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the court had stated that
"[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial." Id. at 76.
This concept of automatic reversal has been sustained in post-Chapman decisions
with respect to a certain category of cases. E.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687
(6th Cir. 1974). In Beasley, the court held that "[h]armless error tests do not apply in
regard to the deprivation of a procedural right so fundamental as the effective assistance
of counsel." Id. at 696; cf. United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1071 (3d Cir.)
(under particular facts of cases absence of counsel at hearing on motion to withdraw a
plea was harmless), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 (1976).
For a further discussion on the developments of the rule of automatic reversal, see
Manse, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53
MINN. L. REV. 519, 537-56 (1969).
40 386 U.S. at 24. The DeCoster II court refers to the burden placed upon the Government as the burden of establishing the harmlessness of "the constitutional violation."
DeCoster II, slip op. at 23. Noting that many courts speak in more general terms, i.e.,
placing or shifting "the burden of proof," it must be recognized that this ambiguous
term can be interpreted to mean one of three specific burdens-the burden of pleading,
the burden of producing evidence, or the burden of persuasion. See MCCORMICK'S
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must be "beyond a reasonable doubt." 4 '
42
The Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle,
expounded upon the reasonableness test set forth in Moore, and like
the Chapman Court, recognized that only harmful errors mandate
reversal. 43 However, the court arrived at a conclusion contra to
Chapman as to which party must bear the burden of proof as to prejudice or lack thereof. 44 Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority,
maintained that where the claimed ineffectiveness of assistance is
based on counsel's failure to present specific evidence at trial, "it is
reasonable . . .to put on [defendant] the burden of showing that the
missing evidence would be helpful."-4 5 Where itis impossible to make
such a showing, or where circumstances have changed since the time
of the constitutional violation such that the availability of evidence is
outside the control of the defendant, a finding of ineffective assistance
will be the sole determining factor in requiring a new trial. 4 6 In these
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336-337 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter

cited as McCoRMICK].

The burden of pleading generally falls upon the plaintiff or that party "seek[ing] to
change the present state of affairs." Id. § 337. Similarly, the placement of this burden
often guides the apportionment of the burdens of introducing evidence and persuasion
to the plaintiff. Id.; see Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. United States, 459 F.2d 1393, 1401 (Ct.
C1. 1972).
The burden of introducing evidence, sometimes referred to as the burden of going
forward, is particularly important in jury trials because it is a mechanism by which the
judge controls the jury. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2487, at 278-79 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE]. A decision upon a factual issue "does not fall to the jury as a matter
of course," Id. § 2487, at 278 (emphasis deleted), rather the judge must be satisfied that
the proffered evidence is sufficient to form a "reasonable basis" from which the jury can
produce a verdict. Id. § 2487, at 279. If this burden is not met, the failing party will lose
without availing the jury an opportunity to resolve the issues. Id.
The final burden is the burden of persuasion, i.e., "persuading the trier of fact."
MCCORMICK, supra § 336. It is the presiding judge's function to establish which party
bears the burden at the time the jury is instructed. Id. He will instruct the jury to find
against the party bearing this burden, if they are in a state of equipoise. Id. Again, there
is no absolute rule as to which party must bear this burden, but it can be assumed
generally that the burden will fall upon that party setting forth an affirmative contention
to which the fact in question is essential. 9 WIGMORE, supra § 2486, at 274-75.
4' 386 U.S. at 24.
42 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970). Appellant's petition below, for habeas corpus relief
from a conviction of aggravated robbery' and conspiracy, alleged a denial of effective
assistance of counsel. It was claimed that counsel, provided by the Philadelphia Voluntary Defender's Association, failed to ask for a continuance to present an alibi witness or
available records which would have supported an alibi defense. See id. at 1115.
43

Id. at 1115.

44Compare 386 U.S. at 24 with 434 F.2d at 1115.
45434 F.2d at 1115.
46 Id. For a detailed discussion of the burden of proving prejudice as it relates to
the harmless-error rule, see Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional
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situations, prejudice need not be shown bv the defendant. 4 7
Unlike the approach taken in Green, the Fourth Circuit, in Coles
v. Peyton, 48 placed the burden of showing a lack of prejudice upon
the Government. 49 In that decision, the court adhered to a reasonableness test, affirmatively setting forth certain duties owed to an indigent defendant which are specifically regarded as elements of effective assistance. 50 When any of these enumerated duties have been
neglected, the burden of showing a lack of prejudice will be placed
upon the Government. 5 1 Unless this burden is met, the approach of
the Fourth Circuit is to hold that there has been a sixth amendment
violation from which the petitioner should be accorded appropriate
relief.52
Right in Transition, 10 VAL. L. REv. 509, 545-49 (1976). The author discusses three
approaches to the allocation of the burden of prejudice. The first is the advocation of
the Chapman rule; the second position is strictly opposed to Chapman, i.e., placing the
burden upon the defendant; and the third is the position adopted by the court in Green.
The author characterizes this last approach as one
tak[ing] a more flexible position than either the advocates of the strict Chapman rule or its opponents. Recognizing the problems inherent in placing the
burden of proof absolutely on either the prosecution or the defendant, this approach opts instead for a more equitable sharing of the burden of proof. Such a
policy of flexibility permits the exigencies of each case to determine who carries the burden of proof.
Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted) (italics in original).
47 See 434 F.2t at 1115.
48 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). The claim of ineffective
assistance in this case was based upon counsel's total failure to investigate. 389 F.2d at
226. Aside from conducting several interviews with the petitioner, the appointed attorney also failed to question witnesses who had previously been ascertained. Id.
49 389 F.2d at 226.
o Id. The duties owed by counsel to an indigent defendant were noted by the court
as follows:
Counsel . . . should be appointed promptly, Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with
his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his
rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are
unavailable. Counsel most conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and
legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself
enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.
Id.
51id.
52 Id. Judge Craven, in a dissenting opinion, stated:
Switching the burden of proof does not make these startling defenses true
but it does put upon the state the exceedingly awkward, if not unbearable,
burden of proving the negative. And it is not suggested that the state can prove
the negative of such matters more easily than petitioner can prove the positive
-the usual reason for switching the burden.
Id. at 230,
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The Coles decision presaged two significant but divergent decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit and the Eighth Circuit concerning the burden of proof as to prejudice where there has been a
sixth amendment violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The District of Columbia Circuit, in DeCoster I, distinguished
cases in which the claim of ineffective assistance arose upon collateral
attack from those in which the issue was presented on direct appeal. 5 3 Chief Judge Bazelon maintained that ineffective assistance
cases arising on direct appeal were not being decided in accordance
with the appropriate standards of the circuit.5 4 As a result, DeCoster
I created a distinct and less stringent test of reasonableness, applicable only to claims on direct appeal. 55 This analysis was consistent
-1 487 F.2d at 1201-02. Ineffectiveness can be raised either directly, by motion of
the defendant pursuant to FED. R. CRiM. P. 33 (New Trial), or indirectly in a separate
civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (federal custody; remedies on motion
attacking sentence). United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 935 & nll-12 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (per curiam). The thrust of § 2255 is to attempt to reduce the extraordinary
number of habeas corpus applications in the jurisdiction in which the defendant is
confined. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). See 2 C. WRIGHT,
supra note 8, § 589, at 579-80. This is accomplished by hearing the § 2255 motion in
the court of conviction. 342 U.S. at 219; 2 C. WRIGHT, supra § 589, at 580.
In essence, there are two important distinctions between these methods of pursuing
a remedy. A § 2255 motion is generally based upon a constitutional deprivation while a
motion for a new trial can be founded upon other grounds. See 2 C. WR1GHT, supra
§ 552, at 485. Moreover, a Rule 33 motion must be made within seven days of the
verdict as compared to an unlimited time within which a § 2255 motion can be made. 2
C. WRiGHT, supra § 552, at 485.
54 487 F.2d at 1201-02. The specific standard alluded to by the court was enunciated in Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Judge Leventhal, writing for the majority in Bruce, maintained
that an accused may obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if he shows both that
there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted
out the essence of a substantial defense either in the District Court or on appeal.
Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
Although the Bruce court specifically limited this test to habeas corpus proceedings,
it did provide that the petitioner need not present such a "powerful showing" to be
successful "on direct appeal." Id. at 117. However, the court failed to interpret this
language in terms of an identifiable quantum of proof. See id. Similarly, cases have
been decided since Bruce in which courts have relied upon this collateral/direct distinction as it related to the burden of proof. E.g., United States v. Haywood, 464 F.2d 756,
763 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per
curiam); United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Harried v.
United States, 389 F.2d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Yet, it was not until DeCoster I that a
pragmatic interpretation of the lesser burden on direct appeal was set forth.
55487 F.2d at 1202-04. In tracing the historical development of this circuit's effective assistance standard, it is important to consider the underlying philosophical and
legal origins as contemplated by the court over the years, i.e., what the sixth amend-
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with the concept previously set forth in the District of Columbia Circuit, that a claim brought on direct appeal required less of a showing
of counsel's incompetency to establish a sixth amendment violation
than would be necessary to demonstrate the same in a collateral
proceeding. 56 In defining this newly adopted reasonableness test, the
court followed Coles in two important respects. It first promulgated
general and specific duties to be performed by counsel in providing
effective assistance.5 7 As a corollary, the court held that if "a substanment has meant to the judiciary. In 1958, the District of Columbia Circuit continued to
adhere to the "farce and mockery" approach. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958). The Mitchell court, in substantiating its
position, considered the meaning of "effective assistance." 259 F.2d at 793. Judge Prettyman, writing for the majority, explained that the defendant's constitutional rights did
not guarantee that counsel's performance would meet "a standard of skill," but rather
emphasized that his rights were procedural in nature, based upon the requirement of a
fair trial. Id. at 790. He reiterated: "the [Supreme] Court has not itself undertaken, nor
has it imposed upon the inferior federal courts, the duty of appraising the quality of a
defense." Id. It was thus held that
the term "effective assistance" ... does not relate to the quality of the service
rendered by a trial lawyer ... except that, if his conduct is so incompetent as to
deprive his client of a trial in any real sense-render the trial a mocker and a
farce is one descriptive expression,-the accused must have another trial.
Id. at 793.
This position was opposed by Judge Fahy, dissenting, who construed the constitutional right as requiring "a standard of skill." Id. at 794. He deferred to the Supreme
Court's view "that the right to counsel is required in a 'substantial sense.' " Id. at 795
(quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 58).
The District of Columbia Circuit departed from the "farce and mockery" test in
Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). It was there held that relief could
be obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) by showing "that there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial
defense." 379 F.2d at 116-17. Although the right to effective assistance was still considered essential to assure a fair trial, id. at 116, the court stated that even in the absence
of gross incompetence, relief should be afforded the petitioner where he is prejudiced
by counsel's misadvice, id. at 121-22. This consideration of the quality of counsel's
services, in conjunction with Judge Fahy's dissent in Mitchell, presaged the DeCoster I
approach. See Recent Development, supra note 26, at 199.
Finally, in Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam), the
court explicitly stated that the right to effective assistance of counsel is not derived from
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Instead, it is a sixth amendment right
which has "more stringent standards than the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 610. Thus, the
procedural-substantive transition was completed.
56 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
57 487 F.2d at 1203-04. The following duties were outlined by the DeCoster I court:
In General-Counsel should be guided by the American Bar Association
Standards for the Defense Function. They represent the legal profession's own
articulation of guidelines for the defense of criminal cases.
Specifically-(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and
as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential
defenses are unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and
tactical choices with his client.
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tial violation of any of these requirements" is shown, the Government
must bear the burden of showing that the error was harmless. 58 Chief
Judge Bazelon expressed the view that such a shift in the burden
was required by the "constitutionally prescribed" presumption of
innocence. 59
Shortly after DeCoster I, the Eighth Circuit addressed the burden of proof issue in McQueen v. Swenson. 6 ° Confronted with an
allegation that trial counsel totally failed to investigate the facts surrounding the incident in question, 61 the court applied the "farce and
mockery" test and implemented a two-step approach in determining
whether the defendant's conviction should be reversed, based on his
right to effective assistance of counsel. 62 The threshold question was
whether counsel had breached a duty deemed necessary to provide
effective assistance. 6 3 The second step consisted of an analysis of
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all actions
necessary to preserve them. Nany rights can only be protected b\ prompt legal
action. The Supreme Court has, tor example, recognized the attorney's role in
protecting the client's privilege against self-incrimination. . . . Counsel should
also be concerned with the accused's right to be released frome custody pending
trial, and be prepare(], where appropriate, to make motions for a pre-trial
psychiatric examination or for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to
determine what matters of defense can be developed. The Supreme Court has
noted that the adversary system requires that "all available defenses are raised"
so that the government is put to its proof. This means that in most cases a
defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses but
also those that the government intends to call, when they are accessible. The
investigation should alway s include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. And, of course, the
duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
58 Id. at 1204.
5' See id.; Bazelon, supra note 10, at 824-25. Chief Judge Bazelon indicated that:
Recognizing that merely specifying the requirements for defense counsel
alone will not give force to the sixth amendment, the court in DeCoster held
further that once a substantial and unjustified violation of any of defense
counsel's duties is demonstrated, the court muist reverse the conviction unless
the Government can show that the defendant was not prejudiced.
Id.
d. 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974). The McQueei court invoked the "farce and
mockery" test but was careful to indicate that such a standard would not he interpreted
so as to allow permissiveness within the profession. Id. at 214 & n.10. It was further
stated that "'[i]t was not intended that the 'mockery of justice' standard be taken literally, but rather that it be employed as an embodimeit of the principle that a petitioner
must shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness." Id.
61 Id. at 209.
62 Id. at 218.
63 Id. Regarding this question, the rlefendant must overcome the Eighth Circuit's
presuimption "that counsel is competent.'' Id. at 216; e.g., Crowe v. State, 484 F.2d
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whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to perform
64
that essential duty.
In framing this issue of prejudice, the court relied upon Chapman v. California, but only to the extent of recognizing the possibility of harmless constitutional error. Beyond this, the court refused to
adopt the harmless error rule set forth in Chapman which placed the
burden of showing harmlessness upon the party benefiting from the
error. 6 5 The McQueen court instead adopted the Green approach by
placing the initial burden of showing prejudice upon the defendant
unless he can demonstrate an impossibility of producing evidence on
that issue. 6 6 Upon such a showing, the burden would shift to the
Government. 67 Thus, while both the Eighth and District of Columbia
Circuits have held that counsel's total failure to investigate constitutes
a sixth amendment violation, their positions differ regarding the
68
placement of the burden of proving prejudice.
Guided by the reasonableness test and accompanying standards
established in DeCoster J,69 the majority in DeCoster II enumerated
a three-step approach to determine whether there was a violation of
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance and whether this
violation mandated relief.70 The analysis required a resolution of the
following issues: "did counsel violate one of his articulated duties; was
the violation 'substantial'; and was the substantial violation 'prejudicial.' -71
In addressing the first of these three issues, the court found that
1359, 1361 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); United States v. Schroeder,
433 F.2d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 943 (1971).
64498 F.2d at 218.
65 Id. at 218-19. It was suggested that the Chapman rule, placing the burden of
proof as to prejudice upon the Government, need not apply to ineffective assistance of
counsel cases. Considering this type of constitutional error to be "sui generis," the court
concluded that an application of the Chapiman principle "would penalize the prosecution for acts over which it can have no control." Id.
66 Id. at 219-20. For a more detailed discussion of the McQueen approach as to the
burden of proof as to prejudice, see 43 FORDHAht L. REV. 310 (1974).
67 Corn pare 498 F.2d at 219-20 with 434 F.2d at 1115. See also notes 44 and 46
supra and accompanying text.
68 Compare 498 F.2d at 220 with 487 F.2d at 1204. For an excellent discussion of
these divergent approaches, see Note, supra note 46, at 540-49.
69 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
70 DeCoster II, slip op. at 11. The court relied on DeCoster I which "contemplat[ed] a three step inquiry." Id. (citing DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1204).
71 DeCoster II, slip op. at 11. This three-step analysis-discussed generally in DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1204-is an appraisal of the "minimal components" of effective
assistance. DeCoster II, slip op. at 11.
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counsel for the defendant had violated his duty to investigate. 72 This
finding was based upon counsel's failure to interview not only the
victim, but also Officer Box, co-defendant Taylor, and possible witnesses at the bar and hotel. 73 Moreover, counsel did not interview
co-defendant Eley until the trial had already begun, 74 nor did he
obtain the preliminary hearing transcripts. 75 Commenting upon these
omissions, the court carefully reasoned that the failure to interview is
distinguishable from the failure to call a witness; the former is a duty
while the latter is discretionary. 76 The crucial distinction lies in the
majority's belief that regardless of whether any appropriate defenses
could be developed, investigation is essential in gathering the information necessary to properly advise a client. 77 Such informed advice
by the attorney would give the client an opportunity to make an intelligent choice between plea bargaining or proceeding to trial and
would lessen the possibility of introducing perjured testimony. 78
72 DeCoster 11, slip op. at 19. In) its inquiry as to the value of investigation and

preparation, the court initially focused on the standards set forth by the American Bar
Association. 1d. at 12-13. The American Bar Association takes the following position
with regard to investigation:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and
degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforceument
authorities. The dlts to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions
or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or his stated desire to
plead guilty.
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
ADMINISTRATION

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPILATION § 4.1

RELATING TO THE

(1974) [hereinafter cited

as ABA STANDARDS].

Interviewing actual and potential witnesses has been viewed bv several circuits as
an essential element of effective assistance. E.g., United States v. Fisher, 477 F.2d 300,
303 (4th Cir. 1973); Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308, 1315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1049 (1972); Gornez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United
States ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 428 F.2d 10, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1970). For a more
detailed discussion of counsel's duty to investigate, see Grano, The Right to Conmsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 M1N'. L. REX. 1175, 1245-49 (1970).
73 DeCoster 11,slip op. at 6, 16-19.
74Id. at 14.
75Id. at 19 u.28.
76Id. at 15. In making this distinction, the court asserted that "there is less need or
room for tactical decisions in deciding who not to interview than .. .in deciding who
not to call." Id. Where the decision is tactical, it will not comprise a substantial violation unless "manifestly unreasonable." Id.; see Campbell v. United States, 377 F.2d
135, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (motion for new trial based on counsel's failure
to call alibi witness should be denied where such a failure is considered a tactical decision).
77 DeCoster II, slip op. at 19, 22-23.
78 Id.
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Having answered the initial issue affirmatively, the DeCoster II
court proceeded to inquire whether the violation was a substantial
one. 79 The implications of the word "substantial" as discussed in its
earlier decision, United States v. Pinkney, 80 were helpful to the DeCoster II court in analyzing the second step. 8 1 The Pinkney court,
adhering to the DeCoster I standards, had observed that counsel's
omissions would be "inconsequential" if the evidence, which had
gone undiscovered because of the omission, could not have formulated a viable defense. 82 Pinkney then adopted the DeCoster I
precept that if such a defense would have been available to the defendant but for counsel's omission, the Government must bear the

burden of showing a lack of prejudice. 8 3 DeCos'ter II equated the
term "consequential" with "substantial" and distinguished a substantial violation of an articulated duty from a harmful error which would
mandate reversal. 8 4 This distinction, in essence, mandated the second
and third steps of the DeCoster II test. Thus, if the defendant meets
the burden of establishing the substantiality of the violation, the
Government's burden of proof as to prejudice-showing that the error

was harmless-nmust be met in order to deny relief. 85
Commenting upon the defendant's burden of showing a substantial violation, the DeCoster II majority indicated that such a burden
could, "[i]n certain circumstances," be met by a presumption where
the likelihood of an impaired defense exists. 8 6 The court limited these
79 1.

at 19-23.

80 543 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Pinkneyj, the defendant alleged that he was

denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of counsel's failure to inform him of
certain passages in the prosecution's "allocution memorandum." Id. at 913-14. This
memorandum linked the defendant to dealings in narcotics, a charge of which he was
unaware, and which resulted in a sentence of three to nine years. Id. at 911. The defendant further alleged that counsel never disputed the accusations set forth in the
inemorandum. Id. at 914.
si DeCoster I1,slip op. at 19-20.
82 543 F.2d at 916-17 & n.60. In affirming the judgment below, the court noted that

the appellant did not provide any evidence which would refute the uncontested allegations made by the Government. Id. at 917 & n.60. It therefore reasoned that counsel's
omission "was inconsequential." Id. at 917 n.60.
83 Id.

84 DeCoster II, slip op. at 19 & n.32, 20, 23-25. The court stated that it "distinguish[es] between the question of whether counsel's violations were consequential, i.e.,

impaired the defense, and the question of whether the impairment was harmful, i.e.,
affected the outcome. [It] avoid[s] using the term 'prejudice' because it blurs these two
inquiries." Id. at 21 u.3 2 (citatio omitted).
85 Id. at 23.

86 Id. at 20. The evidentiary function of a presumption is "to invoke a rule of law
compelling the jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary
from the opponent." 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2491, at 289 (emphasis in original).
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"circumstances" to situations where, in addition to the likelihood of
an impaired defense, the defendant would have great difficulty proving actual impairment. 8 7 In support of invoking such a presumption
in the present case, the court analogized the total failure to investigate
to those situations where counsel is not appointed until immediately
prior to the commencement of the trial.88 The latter circumstance has
already commanded the invocation of a rebuttable presumption of an
impaired defense in other circuits. 89 Consequently, the court did invoke a rebuttable presumption in DeCoster's favor. 90 It necessarily
follows that the DeCoster II majority believed that a total failure to
investigate, in all likelihood, would impair a viable defense and pose
a problem of proof to the defendant in establishing the impairment. 9 '
This analysis led the court to conclude that DeCoster's constitutional
92
right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated.
The remaining issue to be addressed was whether this constitutional violation mandated a new trial-contingent upon the Govern-

In addition to the shift in the burden of introducing evidence, there is a split of authority as to whether a presumption serves to shift the burden of persuasion. Professor
Thayer supports the view that this burden never shifts, He maintains "that the burden
of going forward with evidence may shift often from side to side; while the duty of
establishing [a] proposition is always with the [pleader] ....
" J. THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMON LAW 378 (1898).

Edmund Morgan, however, is of the opinion that a presumption not only shifts the
burden of introducing evidence but also establishes the burden of persuasion. Morgan,
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 67-83 (1933). The former
position is presently the view in many jurisdictions. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 704, Comment on Paragraph (2), at 314-15 (1942).
87 DeCoster I1, slip op. at 20. This prerequisite is in accord with existing evidentiary principles:
Generally . . . the most important consideration in the creation of presumptions
is probability . . . . Usually . . . a presumption is based not only upon the judicial

estimate of the probabilities but also upon the difficulties inherent in proving
that the more prohahle event in fact occurred.
McCORMICK, supra note 40, § 343, at 807.
88 DeCoster II, slip op. at 21.
89 See, e.g., Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 878-79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973). The majority further believed that where a conflict of interest clearly exists,
a presumption of an impaired defense should similarly be imposed. DeCoster II, slip
op. at 21. Both the late appointment situation and the existence of an indisputable conflict of interest were considered by Chief Judge Bazelon to be ""inherent[ly] prejudic[ial].' " Id.
90 DeCoster II, slip op. at 20-23.
91 See DeCoster II, slip op. at 20-21. Chief Judge Bazelon noted that "[i]nvestigation is so central to the defense function that, except in the most extraordinary circuimstances, a gross violation of the duty to investigate will adversely affect a
defendant's rights." Id. at 21.
92 See id.
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ment's failure to establish harmlessness. 93 This burden, which requires a quantum of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 9 4 is a difficult
one, especially where a presumption allows the appellant to forego
proffering pertinent evidence which supposedly would have been discovered but for counsel's lack of diligence. 9 5 It is important to note,
however, that where the appellant must and does meet his burden of
showing a substantial violation without benefit of a presumption, the
Government's burden, as viewed by the majority, "will not be an
onerous [one]: by comparing what the defendant shows should have
been produced with the evidence that was adduced at trial, it should
be readily apparent whether a reasonable doubt exists. '"96 The extrenmely difficult burden placed upon the Government in this situation, where the defendant had benefited from a presumption, was
deemed necessary by the majority in order to prevent the defendant
from being punished for the wrongdoing of another-his appointed
97
counsel.
Judge MacKinnon, dissenting in DeCoster II, rejected the
majority's placement of the burden of proof as to prejudice, maintaining that not only did it significantly interfere with the privileged
98
attorney-client relationship, but that it was also totally unwarranted.
The thrust of the dissent's argument was directed at the majority's
interpretation of the terms "Substantial," "consequential" and "prejudicial." Judge MacKinnon believed that these words were given new
meaning by the majority in order to circumvent prior case law which
had placed the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant. 99 Proposing that the words "substantial," "consequential" and "prejudicial"
are synonymous, the dissent adhered to the view that the defendant's
burden of showing a substantial violation is tantamount to requiring a
showing of prejudice. 100
93Id. at 23.
at 24. The DeCoster I decision failed to establish the quantum of proof required by the Government to show lack of prejudice. One writer, commenting upon that
decision, specifically alluded to the absence of this quantum of proof and indicated that
"[b]ecause of this lack of precision the standard may be subject to entirely inconsistent
applications." Recent Development, supra note 26, at 207-08.
95 DeCoster II, slip op. at 24.
96Id. at 24.
97 Id. at 25.
94 Id.

98 Id., dissenting op. at 2. Prior to commenting upon the sul)stantive issues in ques-

tion, Judge MacKinnon criticized the majority's attempt to change the "settled law of
this circuit" without the case being heard en banc. Id., dissenting op. at i. He believed
that "absent an en banc decision ... both opinions which switch the burden of proof
are nullities.'" Id.
99Id., dissenting op. at 53-54.
100Id. In addition to discussing the case law within the circuit which had estab-
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In addition to the criticism of the majority's semantics, the dissent asserted that the majority-imputed presumption was really a
recognition of inherent prejudice, devised to place the burden of
showing a lack of such prejudice upon the Government.' 1 Judge MacKinnon, however, considered the term "inherent prejudice" to be
ambiguous and emphasized that a claim of inherent prejudice, without a showing by the defendant of a serious impairment, should not
be enough to obtain relief. 10 2 For these reasons, he criticized the
majority's analogy of DeCoster II to situations where counsel's appointment is delayed until the eve of trial, and stressed that the facts
lished the burden of proof as to prejudice as resting with the defendant, see generallyi
note 54 siipra and accompanying text, the dissent relied upon several Supreme Court
holdings in developing what it believed to be the controlling principles on the allocation of the burden. Said decisions were based upon claims other than a denial of the
right to effective assistance. Id., dissenting op. at 48-50. In particular, the dissent cited
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 796-97 (1975), in which the defendant alleged that the
trial setting and the process of selecting the jury were prejudicial to his case. DeCoster
1I, dissenting op. at 50. In ,Murphy, the Court held that the burden of establishing such
prejudice was on the defendant. 421 U.S. at 803. In relying upon this decision, Judge
MacKinnon indicated that "[w]ith regard to the sixth amendment issue of effectiveness
of counsel, there [was] no possible reason for holding that the rule that defendant show
prejudice mysteriously discontinues.'" DeCoster 1I, dissenting op. at 50.
With this as his basis, Judge MacKinnon proceeded to attack the majority's use of
the terms substantial, consequential and prejudicial:
The key to ineffectiveness of counsel, per the majority in DeCoster I, is
"substantial" violation of the precepts. Now we are told here in DeCoster II
that "'substantial" means "consequential." What an exercise in elementary semantics. What ny colleagues are trying to do is to skate around the "prejudicial" requirement and make it appear as though they have invented a new
standard. But their discovery in reality merely adds up to a failure to recognize
that when they are talking about "'substantial" and "consequential" they are
doing nothing more than describing essential ingredients of "'prejudice.'' To
have prejudice the causative flactor must be "substantial" and sufficiently related to the result in a causal relationship so that the result may correctly be
considered a consequence of that factor, i.e., "consequential." Actually, 'substantial'" and "consequential" in the abstract, and divorced from "prejudice," as
umy colleagues apparently try to isolate them are meaningless. They are merely
adjectives standing alone. Error that is just "substantial" and not "prejudicial"
is of no moment. And error that is "consequential" (and what error is not a
consequence of some causative factor?), without being prejudicial, is immaterial. Thus, to be relevant at all, the neglect must be of sufficient substance so
that it may be found to be both a consequence of the alleged failure and prejudicial.
Id., dissenting op. at 53-54 (citation omitted) (italics in original).
101DeCoster II, dissenting op. at 30-34. Judge NiacKinnon opined that the majority
had transformed the general guidelines established in DeCoster I into duties which are
to be closely scrutinized by the judiciary. Moreover, it appeared to hin that the majority
considered a breach of one of these enumerated duties to approach an "instantaneous
constitutional violatio[n].' '" Id., dissenting op. at 31.
102 Id., dissenting op. at 33-34.
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must be considered and prejudice proven in each case "except in exceptional circumstances."103
In furtherance of the proposition that the circuit's own precedent
supported placing the burden of showing prejudice upon the defendant, the dissent set forth an alternative interpretation of the Pinkney
decision. 10 4 The Pinkney court had considered the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel as it would any other motion for a new
10 5
trial-the determinative factor being newly discovered evidence.
Judge Robinson, writing for the majority, had equated the defendant's burden of disclosing newly discovered evidence with the DeCoster I showing of substantiality.106 After this disclosure by the
defendant, "the Government's burden is to demonstrate lack of prejudice therefrom. 10 7
The dissent in DeCoster II believed the importance of the Pinkney analysis to be the omission of any "mention of absolving [the]
defendant of the initial duty to show prejudice-because no such ab-

solution is possible." 1 0 8 The Government's burden should thus be relegated to that of "going forward" after a showing of prejudice by the
103 Id., dissenting op. at 34 (emphasis in original). The dissenting opinion criticized
the majority's reliance upon this analogy because its ultimate effect is to "ignor[e] the
facts here present." Id., dissenting op. at 33. The dissent further maintained that the
determination of whether counsel's violation has impaired a defense is a subjective one.
For this reason, a substantial violation cannot be "inherent or obvious [but] must be
proved." Id., dissenting op. at 34; see Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir.)
(Craven, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
Inherent prejudice has been discussed by the Supreme Court with specific reference to the late appointment of counsel. The Court maintained that
we are not disposed to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment of counsel or to hold that .. .an evidentiary
hearing must be held to detennine whether the defendant has been denied his
constitutional right to counsel.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970) (italics in original).
Chambers has been interpreted to "permi[t] adoption of either a presumption or a
totality of the circumstances approach." Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 877 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). Consequently, there is some diversity on the issue of
whether late appointment constitutes an inherently prejudicial violation. Compare 472
F.2d at 879 (stating that "[w]here a petitioner demonstrates late appointment of counsel,
we will continue to employ the presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel") with
Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251, 1252-54 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971)
(recognizing.that counsel's experience is one of several variables that must be considered in determining the amount of time necessary to prepare a case, the presumptive
approach is rejected in favor of a totality of the circumstances test).
104 DeCoster II, dissenting op. at 41-48.
i05 543 F.2d at 916; see note 53 supra and accompanying text.
106 543 F.2d at 916 & n.59, 917 & n.60.
107 Id.
at 916 n.59.

108DeCoster II, dissenting op. at 47 (emphasis in original).
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defendant.' 0 9 Continuing this analysis, Judge MacKinnon maintained
that if the newly created "substantiality" test is, in fact, equivalent to
the requisite of showing prejudice, then the Chapman harmless constitutional error rule is inapplicable. 1 10 This followed because Chapman dealt with a situation where a substantial violation of the constitution had already been shown to exist, whereas in DeCoster II,
the existence vel non of a constitutional violation was at issue. 11 1
The placement of the burden of proof as to prejudice upon the
Government appears to underscore the importance of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Yet, closer analysis of the court's threestep approach reveals that it is only where counsel has egregiously
violated a duty that the defendant's constitutional right mandates a
shift in the burden of proving prejudice. This result occurs because
the issue of prejudice is not reached unless the defendant meets the
burden of showing the substantiality of the violation."x 2 The defendant is relieved of this burden where "the magnitude of counsel's
violation and its probable effect" are such that a constitutional violation can be presumed. 113 Thus, an egregious violation, likely to have
impaired a defense, will trigger a presumption of substantiality and
allow the court to reach the third step which requires the Government to bear the burden of showing a lack of prejudice. 114
Although the majority clearly distinguishes between the burden
of proving the substantiality of the violation and the burden of proof
as to prejudice, the practical application of the second step may be
109 Id.

55-57.
Id., dissenting op. at 55. For a detailed discussim if the Choapman principle, see
notes 38-41 su pra an d accompanying text.
112 See DeCoster
I1,
slip op. at 23. To view the defendant's right to effective assistance as not being significantly altered by the DeCoster 11 approach is to equate the
term ~substantially- with "prejudice." In effect, when counsel's violation is presumed
110 Id., dissenting op. at
1I

to be substantial, the burden of introducing evidence on the issue of' prejudice is placed

upon the Government. However, in the absence of a presumption, this burden remains
with the defendant. For a more detailed discussion of the use of the terms substantial
and prejudicial, compare note 99 supra and accompanying text with DeCoster II, slip
op. at 20 n.32.
113 DeCoster II, slip op. at 23.
114See id. at 20-23. The language of the majority opinion clearly limited the imposi-

tion of a presumption of substantiality to those circumstances where the likelihood of an
impaired defense is apparent. Id. This limitation is further emphasized by the court's
reliance upon cases in which a late appointment of counsel gave rise to a )resumption
of an impaired defense. Id.at 21 & n.33. The court explained that it was counsel's total
failure to investigate which made the analogy of' the existing facts to late appointment
cases appropriate. Id. at 21. For a discussimll of the evidentiary principles underlying
the application of a presumlption, see notes 86-87 supra andI accompanying text.
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considered the equivalent of an allocation of the burden of proof as to
prejudice. The placement of this burden would be contingent upon
the presence or absence of a rebuttable presumption of an impaired
defense.' 15 Therefore, the Government will be called upon to meet
the burden of proving a lack of prejudice only if the defendant succeeds in overcoming the difficulties of proving an "impaired defense,"
or where circumstances dictate that such an impairment should be
presumed. 116 In effect, then, the second step successfully eliminates
frivolous claims of ineffective assistance while protecting the defendant where there is an obvious impairment of a defense. In any event,
whether substantiality must be proved by the defendant or is presumed by the court, the majority's position is that a substantial violation is essentially harmful per se. Though the per se approach was not
expressly adopted, the court's position is compatible with a per se
approach since the Government is required to show a lack of prej117
udice beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to those circuits which distinguish between the issues of competency and prejudice, a conflict exists as to which party
bears the burden of proof as to prejudice."I 8 For example, the Dis115 See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
116 See DeCoster II, slip op. at 23.
117 Id.
at 24. One commentary has discussed Chapman in connection with the proposition that a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel can never be harmless error.
83 HARV. L. REV. 814, 816 & n.18, 820-21 (1970). The relevant language in the Chapman decision is the following:
We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in
our recent case of Fahy/ v. Connecticut. . . . There we said: "The question is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction." . . . Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error, this statement in Fahy itself
belies any belief that all trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal. At the same time, however, like the federal harmlesserror statute, it emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that "affect substantial rights" of a part.
386 U.S. at 23 (footnote and citations omitted) (italics in original).
The above commentary advocated automatic reversal where counsel has been found
to be ineffective and further reasoned that it is impossible to determine the import that
missing evidence would have on the outcome of a prosecution. Because of this difficulty
in determining whether "the error was harmless," automatic reversal was deemed
necessary. 83 HARV. L. REV., supra at 821. For a more detailed discussion of the concept
of automatic reversal when precipitated by a constitutional error, see Saltzburg, supra
note 16, at 999-1002, 1018 (suggestion that "[riequiring the prosecution to overcome a presumption of prejudice is tantamount to mandating automatic reversal whenever there are errors during trial"); Manse, supra note 39, at 540-47.
118 Compare DeCoster II, slip op. at 23-25 and Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d at 226
with United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d at 1115 and McQueen v. Swenson,
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trict of Columbia Circuit and the Fourth Circuit place the responsibility to demonstrate a lack of prejudice upon the Government while
the Third and Eighth Circuits place the burden of proof as to prejudice upon the defendant unless a change in circumstances makes it
impossible for this burden to be met. 1 19 Despite this obvious conflict,
it is questionable whether these divergent approaches necessarily
mandate differing results.
For example, application of the Third Circuit approach, although
placing the threshold burden of showing minimal prejudice upon the
defendant,' 2 0 is not dissimilar to the position of the DeCoster II
court. Illustrative of the application of the Third Circuit approach is
United States ex rel. Moore v. Russell' 2 ' where the petitioner alleged
1 22
that counsel's failure to produce an alibi witness was prejudicial.
The court denied habeas corpus relief, holding that the petitioner
23
failed to prove that the missing evidence would have been helpful. 1
If the DeCoster II test were to be applied to the facts of this case, the
same result could be reached. Although calling a witness is not one of
the specific duties articulated by the ABA 124 or DeCoster I1,125 the
court may still consider this failure to be a breach of a duty owed
to the defendant because such enumerated duties are only guidelines.' 26 However, under DeCoster II, the defendant must show, in
addition, that the failure to call a particular witness substantially impaired his defense. 1 2 7 Thus, since the circumstances in Russell did
not warrant a presumption of an impaired defense, it can be assumed
498 F.2d at 214, 220. For a detailed discussion of the burden of proof as to prejudice as
addressed in the above cases, see notes 42-68 supra and accompanying text.
119 E.g., United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Thomas v.
Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson,
531 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); United States v. Crowley,
529 F.2d 1066, 1070 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1976); Stokes v. Pevton, 437
F.2d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 1970).
120 434 F.2d at 1115; see notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
121 330 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
122 Id. at 1078-79.

123 Id. at 1079-80. This finding was based upon testimony at a post conviction hearing establishing that the alibi witness was unreliable, in conjunction with the identification of the petitioner by two victims of the robbery in question. Id.
124 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, § 5.2(b). The American Bar Association
clearly provides that "[t]he decisions on what witnesses to call . . . are the exclusive
province of the lawyer after consultation with his client." Id.
125 DeCoster II, slip op. at 10-11. For the articulated duties adopted by DeCoster
II, see note 57 supra.
126 DeCoster II, slip op. at 11. For a discussion of the comparison of a failure to call
a witness with the failure to interview, see note 76 supra and accompanying text.
127 DeCoster II, slip op. at 19-20.
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that a judge of the District of Columbia Circuit could similarly find
that the defendant has failed to show that the testimony of the alibi
witness would have established a valid defense.
A further illustration of the comparison of these divergent tests is
United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport.128 In this Third Circuit case,
the denial of habeas corpus was reversed because of defense counsel's
conflict of interest. Only a minimal showing by the petitioner was
29
required to find counsel's representation constitutionally defective. 1
This threshold burden did not require specific proof of prejudice, but
rather was satisfied by a showing of possible prejudice regardless of
its remoteness. 1 30 Under the DeCoster II test, the facts of this case
1 31
could possibly give rise to a presumption of an impaired defense.
The record established obvious conflicting interests, and showed
clearly that counsel did not attempt to differentiate the petitioner's
involvement in the crime from that of his codefendants.1 3 2 Obviously,
any negation of one defendant's connection would logically emphasize
128

129

478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 210-11. The petitioner, convicted of possessing unlawful lottery slips, en-

gaging in bookmaking and operating a lottery, alleged that he was deprived of his right
to effective assistance of counsel. This claim was based upon the fact that one attorney
represented the petitioner in addition to five codefendants. Id. at 204. Furthermore, the
record indicated that counsel's closing argument failed to differentiate the involvement
of the petitioner from that of his codefendants. Therefore, because the circumstances
were such that an exoneration of any defendant(s) would necessarily implicate the
others, a conflict of interest was apparent. Id. at 208-09.
130 Id. at 210, In support of this minimal threshold burden, the Hart court relied
upon Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
915 (1970) which held "[t]here must be some showing of a possible conflict of interest
or prejudice, however remote, before a reviewing court will find the dual representation
constitutionally defective." Id. at 375 (emphasis added). This minimal standard of prejudice was applied with deference being given to the Mloore standard of normal competency and the Green approach as to the placement of the burden of proof as to prejudice. 478 F.2d at 210; see notes 32-37, 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
131 This follows initially from the general duty counsel owes to his client to "be
guided by the American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function.
DeCoster II, slip op. at 10. Those standards provide in part:
Conflict of Interest.
(a) At the earliest feasible opportunity defense counsel should disclose to
the defendant any, interest in or connection with the case or any other matter
that might be relevant to the defendant's selection of a lawyer to represent him.
(b) . . . [A] lawyer . . . should not undertake to defend more than one
defendant in the same criminal case if the duty to one of the defendants may'
conflict with the duty to another.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 73, § 3.5, at 123.
A presumption of an impaired defense may be attributable to counsel's apparent
awareness of the circumstances giving rise to the conflict; his refusal to terminate such
joint representation; and the inherently prejudicial effect this situation is likely to have
upon the defendant. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
132 478 F.2d at 208.
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the extent to which his codefendant was responsible for the criminal
activity. 13 3 Under these circumstances, the flagrancy of counsel's disloyalty may be sufficient to presume a substantial violation and place
13 4
the burden of showing a lack of prejudice upon the prosecution.
Thus, despite the conflict among the circuits, a degree of compatibility does exist between these divergent approaches.
Aside from the burden of proof as to prejudice, the DeCoster II
court indirectly raised two subsidiary issues: specifically, whether a
breach by counsel should be distinguished from a governmental
error, such as late appointment, and whether privately retained counsel should be distinguished from appointed counsel. By analogizing
the present case to a situation where there exists a late appointment
of counsel, the majority implies that either a breach by counsel or a
governmental error should be afforded the same analysis in order to
protect the defendant's constitutional right. This viewpoint obtains
despite the possibility of unjustly burdening the prosecution in the
latter situation. 135
With regard to the "retained-appointed" distinction, the traditional view has been that privately retained counsel could not be the
subject of an ineffectiveness claim.' 3 6 DeCoster II appears to disregard this distinction by adopting the contemporary precept that it is
immaterial whether counsel was appointed or retained when considering his effectiveness.' 3 7 This position is reflected by the fact that
Id. at 208-09.
134 See notes 88-9 supra and accompanying text.
135 DeCoster II, slip op. at 21. This view visibly relegates the violation itself to a
matter of secondary importance while emphasizing the ultimate concern of promoting
justice. The Supreme Court has similarly stressed the sum and substance of our adversarial process which is to punish the guilty while protecting the rights of the parties.
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). But cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d
979, 984 (2d Cir. 1976) (in determining the validity of a guilty plea where the defendant
was misinformed as to his possible sentence, the court held that "where governmental
error is responsible for the misinformation, the government must hear the burden of
proof on the issue of reliance").
136 E.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426 (3d Cir. 1953),
aff'd, 351 U.S. 454 (1956); Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Counsel: Why the
Dichotoonu?, 55 A.B.A.J. 254, 254 & nn.2 & 3 (1969). In Darcy, the court attributed
counsel's errors to the defendant through the concept of agency and thus precluded his
ineffective assistance claim because of this implication. 203 F.2d at 426. For a more
detailed discussion of this agency theory, see Note, su pra note 46, at 510 n.11. This
commentary continues with a discussion of an alternative theory, of "state action" which
distinguished retained from appointed counsel. Id. It notes that -[s]ome courts have
concluded that counsel's incompetency is constitutionally significant only when there is
positive state action, most notably in the form of court appointment of counsel." Id.
137 See DeCoster II, slip op. at 10-11. For cases which adopt this contemporary
precept, see United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc),
133
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regardless of his status, counsel must comply with those duties promulgated by the American Bar Association and the DeCoster I decision. 13 Consequently, only those factors directly influencing, or attributable to, counsel's conduct should be relevant to determining the
issue of competency.
The ultimate issue is whether the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari in a case similar to DeCoster II in order to establish a
uniform standard of competence, and if so, whether the Court also
should proceed to settle the conflict among the circuits as to who
must bear the burden of proof as to prejudice. Recent developments
within the Eighth Circuit indicate that a uniform standard of competence, standing alone, would not have a significant impact upon this
area of the law. That circuit has made a transition from a "farce and
mockery" test to a reasonableness standard,' 3 9 but because the former standard had been flexibly applied, the transition lacked import. 140
Because each standard is subject to being implemented differently in each jurisdiction, the impact of a uniform standard would be
negligible unless the Supreme Court were to enumerate specific
duties or precisely define the elements of effective representation as
required by the sixth amendment. The District of Columbia Circuit
has certainly taken the initiative in this area through its particularized
analysis of counsel's duties. This model should perhaps serve as an

cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975); Goodwin v. Cardwell, 432 F.2d 521, 522 (6th Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Schultz v. Twomey, 404 F. Supp. 1300, 1305 (N.D. I11.
1975). Contra, Williams v. Estelle, 416 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (privately
retained and court appointed counsel are differentiated by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals). See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1284 (1975) (where the author stated that "[p]ublic defenders are-probably more vulnerable than private attorneys to post-conviction proceedings alleging the
ineffective assistance of counsel").
138 DeCoster II, slip op. at 10-11.
139 Compare Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1976) and McQueen v. Swen-

son, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974) with United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir.
1976) and Crimson v. United States, 510 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1975).
140 See 498 F.2d at 214. The McQueen court evaluated its standard as follows:
Stringent as the "mockery of justice" standard may seem, we have never
intended it to be used as a shibboleth to avoid a searching evaluation of possible constitutional violations; nor has it been so used in this circuit. It was not

intended that the "mockery of justice" standard be taken literally, but rather
that it be employed as an embodiment of the principle that a petitioner must
shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness.
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elementary guideline, capable of being developed further by the Supreme Court.
Although it would be possible for the Supreme Court to attempt
to definitively resolve the inconsistencies which exist among the circuit courts with respect to the placement of the burden of proof, this
issue is not of critical importance. As has been demonstrated, the
same result can be obtained whether the burden of proof as to prejudice is placed on the Government or the defendant. 14 1 Rather, any
decision in this area should concentrate on clearly enunciating the
standards by which the effectiveness of counsel is to be judged.
John J. Maiorana
141 See

text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.

EDITORIAL NOTE

As of the date of publication, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had reheard the DeCoster case en banc; decision was still
pending.

